There is currently a heated debate over the alleged dissolution of "Progressive" Islam, a movement that was supposedly going to lead the so-called "moderate masses" towards an enlightened but robust faith that would thrive in our contemporary age. After an initial period of supposed solidarity and seemingly endless potential, this downward turn makes me want to re-think the implicitly categorical suppositions underlying that general project. When looking at the current situation of Islam with a cold impartial eye, one can clearly see that many Muslims no longer believe the same things.
Though this may seem as an unfortunate situation, the implications are not entirely negative. There is still a very strong element of unity. As a student of the history of religion I find no "hidden sectarianism" waiting to explode into a plethora of new religions. Rather, what could be said is there are Muslims of different persuasions and there will come a time when those persuasions will be better articulated and defined. What I wish to demonstrate is that similar to the Jewish experience in America, Islam could potentially begin to be defined in a comparable tripartite structure. Also like the Jewish experience, there will not be a "great rupture" but rather a movement towards three different points in the current Islamic continuum. What I hope to show is that unity does not necessarily mean uniformity, and that divisions that are all too real cannot be set aside for the "feel-good" factor of standing under a unified but hegemonic banner.
I will take as a starting point the thought of undeniably the leading advocate and poster-child of Progressive Islam, Tariq Ramadan. I think Ramadan had an inkling of what I am referring to when he describes the "six major tendencies" in his book Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Under Ramadan's categorization, there is Scholastic Traditionalism (further divided into the four madhabs), Salafi Literalism, Salafi Reformism, Political Literalist Salafism, "Liberalist" or "Rationalist" Reformism, and Sufism. I found his categorization of these tendencies highly engaging, and to some degree it is a fairly accurate portrayal of some of the current differences among Muslims. However, I also found it to be in many ways to be defective. It tends to highlight some differences at the expense of others; for example, there is a full representation of the three dominant modes of Salafism, yet the substantial differences within Sufism and Rationalism are virtually brushed away in exchange for an idiosyncratic presentation. I think this is partially guided by a biased belief that the Salafi banner will be more crucial and active than the Sufi and Rationalist ones. Ramadan is surely entitled to his opinion, yet it does have its analytical limitations. At what point is a Salafi Literalist more of a Hanbali and thus more accurately in the Scholastic Traditionalist camp? At what point is a Salafi a Salafi Reformer or a Political Salafi Literalist? The distinction may be one of semantics, but it is still crucial if one wants to accurately describe the differences between Muslims. It seems to me that the three Salafi groups either blur into each other, or collapse onto the Scholastic Traditionalists. If Ramadan wanted to conduct a more accurate categorization, he should not have used such an arbitrary criteria to distinguish the different Salafi tendencies.
However, I do agree with some of his descriptions. There are figures that come to mind who are clearly Salafi Reformers such as Muhammad Abduh, and others that are Political Literalist Salafis such as Mullah Omar of the Taliban. If Ramadan wishes to indicate that these are different tendencies, and highlight their differences, then that is perfectly acceptable and indeed quite accurate descriptions for certain specific cases. However, there are larger trends that at times cut through some of these tendencies and at other times envelop them. To point this out, where would one place Tariq Ramadan in his own tendency schema? Is he a Salafi Reformer, a Salafi literalist, or a Rational Reformer? Well, in the chapter dealing with the shari'a he is somewhere between being a Rationalist or Salafi Reformer (as could be discerned by his predilection for maslaha and ijtihad) yet his discussion of riba in his later chapter places him more into the Literalist camp. There must be a simpler and more accurate way of categorization.
The conceptual structure for a better categorization should be based on a continuum between two theoretical end points: tradition and change. Now it could be argued that tradition does allow for change, or that people can change towards a better appreciation of the correct tradition. However, these endpoints should be regarded as theoretical ideal-types. and there is even a version of them in Ramadan where he places "text" in contrast to "reason". Now these tendencies may have interesting things to say about texts and reason, but I think a more revealing categorization would look at the persuasions that Muslims have towards tradition and change.
The Jewish Experience in America: A Model for Islam
According to Joseph L. Blau; "Reform, Orthodox, Conservative, however much they may disagree, all agree in granting some force to Jewish tradition, and all agree in recognizing the need for change and adaptation." The difference, however, between these three groups is their readiness to change and their commitment to aspects of Jewish tradition. On one extreme, Reform Judaism was centered around the idea that the individual was able to pick and choose from the rich Jewish traditions which facets of their faith was crucial to their identity, and how to integrate them to their lives. On the other extreme, Orthodox Judaism is based on the principle that the strict adherence to the letter of traditional Jewish law is the basis of faith, and this is usually under the direction of a Chief Rabbi. As for Conservative Judaism, it is the community that decides which part of the tradition is crucial and which is amenable to change, and this is done through the careful reading and interpretation of traditional Jewish texts.
The development of the tripartite structure of American Judaism resulted from a historical progression of actions and reactions to various efforts at defining American Judaism. When enlightenment ideals began being employed in Europe, there was a rising, though limited, trend of emancipation, which resulted in a desire amongst some Jews towards a fuller integration into the larger societies where they lived.“[In] its extreme it led to apostasy, the baptismal certificate considered the ticket of admission to the world beyond the ghetto.†However, some reactions were not so drastic, and resulted in a form of “controlled change†that allowed for an adaptation of Jewish tradition for current conditions. The seed of Reform Judaism very much comes from the same intellectual soil of the enlightenment, and it carried over with the Jews who migrated to America in the 19th century. In America they found a society that was conducive to religious freedom, as well as a capacity to escape normal religious hierarchies. An observer would be “struck by the proliferation of sects which freedom permits.†At first, the Jewish community came together because of international events that caused a backlash against them, and in that short period of solidarity they founded Hebrew Union College. When the progenitors of the Reform movement tried to impose uniformity over other Jewish congregations, the Conservatives broke off and founded their own seminary, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Similarly, when immigration patterns started bringing more Eastern European Jews, the Orthodox faction broke off and brought in Rabbi Jacob Joseph from Lithuania to be their Chief Rabbi.
This process resulted in what Blau calls the “protestantization†of American Judaism: “The three large ‘denominational’ organizations are federations only; their powers are merely advisory, and their advice is not always accepted by their constituent synagogues…because they [individual synagogues] depend on the good will and generosity of their members.†In the end, it was the will and generosity of the congregation that could steer the orientation of their synagogue; because of the religious liberties protected by the American system, Jews could choose which synagogue that best suited their religious persuasion with respect to tradition and change. Near the end of the 18th century, the organizational prowess of the Reform, and the numerical superiority of the Orthodox, made the Conservative denomination seem doomed, as all it had was a seminary. However, the Conservative synagogues are now (if one includes Reconstructionalists) the largest Jewish denomination in America. How could this have happened? It is because in the battle of ideas for synagogue attendance, the Conservative Rabbis appealed to a broader segment of Jewish society. Since American Jews are free to go to any denomination they please, they will after all go to the one that better approximates their own attitudes towards tradition and change. And because they are the primary source of funding, they also have tremendous influence outside of denominational lines.
Let us now take another look at Ramadan’s six tendencies, but this time with respect to American Judaism. If Reform is the broad umbrella that represents the denomination that is most amenable to change—at least comparatively to the other two—then Ramadan’s “Rationalist†group would clearly reside within or close to an Islamic variant of this category. However, there is a substantial difference; under Ramadan’s category, the primary aim of this group is to secularize and assimilate into the larger western context. Under the Reform categorization, it is up to the individual which facets of the traditional Islamic corpus that would be integrated into their lives, and in accordance to their own personal interpretation of what is crucial and what is amenable to change. The emphasis here is on personal interpretation and execution of what it means to be Muslim. If that means living in a secular western context, then it is the individual’s prerogative. However, if they wish to live more in accordance to the traditional modes, they would still be in the fold of Reform if they believe that others have a similar right to religious autonomy. Change and adaptation is here is left to the individual, as is their adherence to the tradition.
If tradition, however, occupies the central role in praxis and interpretation, then an Orthodox Islamic category would be effective to describe Salafi Literalists, the political variant of Salafism, and to a great degree Scholastic Traditionalism. If the letter of the law is absolute, and its explication is the task of only those who are trained within the tradition, then I believe this accurately describes their position with regards to tradition and change. It is not absolute that the Orthodox are against change, it just means that they are the most likely to control change in accordance to their interpretation of tradition. The emphasis here is a strict reading of the letter of the law and its implementation in everyday life.
The Conservatives would be, like their Jewish counterparts, stuck somewhere between the freewheeling Reformers and the stringent Orthodox. To them the underlying concern would be the community, and what it regards as the appropriate balance between tradition and change. They would understand that within the Islamic tradition there is an internal dynamism that could solve many contemporary problems, but they would have to be actively sought through a creative process of reading and interpretation. I think the Salafi Reformers are actually closer to this category, though there are probably elements that would be more solidly in the Reform camp. This is also probably the position of some who under Ramadan’s schema would be in the Scholastic Traditionalism mold. These would be traditionally trained ‘ulema who have a very liberal outlook on certain issues, yet are not willing to abandon Islamic rulings on others. I would actually place Tariq Ramadan himself in this category because he certainly expresses some of its main tendencies; i.e. the ability to find and utilize the traditional tools that have allowed for its dynamism, such as maslaha, maqasid al shari‘a, and ijtihad. He also has a penchant for sticking to his guns on certain matters, which though at times it looks random to someone like me, it truly shows the defining characteristic of this group; to be open to change, and sometimes a lot of change, but only to a certain (perhaps socially specified) point.
It is important to stress here that I do not envision a full scale “protestantization†of Islam, but I certainly detect a movement towards that direction. I do not think there will be the same “wars of religion†as there was in Europe, but rather like the Jewish experience, émigré societies will have to struggle with questions of tradition and change, and they might end up with similar solutions. And like the Jewish experience, I do not predict that fragmentation will be that divisive, as Joseph Blau reminds us, “unity and uniformity are by no means the same.â€
What does this mean for the current condition of Progressive Islam? Well, I think the implications are clear, since the ad-hoc post-9/11 solidarity was precisely that: temporary and a response to a tragic and highly consequential event. Like the Jewish experience, it will have to become the individual Muslim congregation’s choice how they conceive of what is an appropriate adherence to tradition and an acceptable amount of change. We will still have MSA futoor together, lobby our governments for the causes we hold mutually dear, but when the athaan for Friday prayer blares forth it has to be the individual’s choice if she wishes to stand behind, in front of, to the side of, or in another room entirely of her congregationalists